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THE INQUIRY we undertook in Part II, as to what exactly the pivotal terms
"material," "mental", "mind," and "life" denote, was unavoidably somewhat
lengthy and technical. It may therefore be well to summarize its findings before
we proceed, with their aid, to an exposition of the case for the possibility of
survival.
1. Summary of the findings of Part II
The first question considered in Part II
was: Which things - i.e., which objects, characteristics, events, processes,
relations, etc., - are denominated "material" or "physical." The answer reached
was that, fundamentally, they are the things that are or can be made
perceptually public; and in addition, derivatively, the minute or otherwise
unperceivable existential constituents of those.
The next question was: Which things are denominated alive" or "living." The
answer was that the marks by which we distinguish them from the things called
"dead," or "inorganic," are in general metabolism, growth, respiration,
reproduction, and adaptation to environment; and that, more particularly in the
case of human bodies, the minimal marks of their being "alive" not "dead" are
breathing, heart beat, and maintenance of body temperature above a certain
level.
The third question was: Which things - still taking this word in the comprehensive sense - are denominated "mental" or "psychical." We found the answer to be that,
fundamentally, they are the ones capable of being introspectively observed; and
in addition, derivatively, whatever unintrospectable processes, events, etc.,
are existentially implicit in those that are introspectable.
The fourth question was: What is "a mind." Distinguishing between the
history of
a mind, which consists of a series of events, and the nature of a mind at a
given time in its history, we found that its nature analyzes as a set of
systematically interconnected "dispositions," i.e., capacities, powers,
abilities; and that each of these consists in the more or less abiding
sufficiency, or as the case may be, insufficiency, of change of some particular
kind C in a state of affairs of a kind S, to cause change of another particular
kind E in S immediately thereafter. For example, that a person is of a patient
disposition means that kinds of occurrences that would in similar situations be
sufficient to cause most other persons to feel irritation are in his case
insufficient to cause this.
The dispositions, which together constitute the nature of a mind are, we further
found, of three comprehensive kinds: psycho-psychical, physico-psychical, and
psycho-physical, according as, respectively, the cause-event and the
effect-event are both psychical, or the cause-event physical and the
effect-event psychical, or the cause-event psychical and the effect event
physical.
Lastly, we noticed that existence of a mind having a given nature consists, not
in existence of something distinct from and "having" the set of dispositions
that define that mind's nature, but in the series of actual occurrences which
constitute exercise of ones or others of those dispositions; that is, constitute
the historical individuation of a mind having that particular nature.
2. Theoretical possibility, empirical possibility, and factuality
In
Chapt Ill,
we set forth the considerations that constitute the basis - in common knowledge,
in the knowledge possessed by the Natural Sciences, and in certain theoretical
reflections - for the contention that survival of the individual's consciousness
after the death of his body is impossible. The clarification of key concepts we
achieved in Part II now puts us in position to judge whether or how far the
items of the case against the possibility of survival are strong and cogent, or
on the contrary weak or inept.
If and in so far as they turn out to have either of these defects, then and in
so far they fail to establish the impossibility they are alleged to establish,
and they therefore leave open the possibility of a life after death. That is,
the case for the possibility (not automatically the reality) of survival
consists of the case against the adequacy of the grounds on which survival is
asserted to be impossible: That a life after death remains a theoretical
possibility would mean that the theoretical grounds alleged to entail its
impossibility are unsound; or, if sound in themselves, nevertheless do not
really but only seemingly entail it. And, that survival remains an empirical
possibility would mean that survival, notwithstanding possible appearances to
the contrary, really is compatible with all the facts and laws of Nature so far
truly ascertained by the sciences.
If critical examination of the merits of the case against the possibility of
survival reveals that, notwithstanding the negative "verdict of science", a
life after death remains both a theoretical and an empirical possibility, then
certain questions will confront us.
The first will be as to what prima facie positive empirical evidence, if any, is
available that survival is a fact. Next, we shall have to ask whether such
evidence for it as our inquiry may turn up is really sufficient to establish
survival or the probability of it. And, if this itself should be dubious, then
the methodologically prior question will force itself upon us, as to what kind
and quantity of evidence, if it should be or become available, would
conclusively prove, or make conclusively more probable than not, that survival
is a fact. Overarching of course these various problems, there is the question
as to what forms survival, if it be a fact, can plausibly be conceived to take.
3. The tacit theoretical premise of the empirical arguments against the
possibility of survival
One of the facts listed in
Chapt. III as allegedly
proving that consciousness cannot survive the body's death was that a severe
blow on the head permanently or temporarily terminates all the evidences of
consciousness which the body had until then been giving. This, it is alleged,
and likewise the other empirical facts cited in that chapter, shows that a
person's states of consciousness are direct products of the neural processes
that normally take place in his brain; and hence that when, at death, these
terminate, then consciousness necessarily lapses also.
This conclusion, however, is based not simply on the observed facts, but also on
a certain theoretical premise, tacitly and in most cases unconsciously employed.
The nature of it becomes evident if one considers the prima facie analogous
empirical fact that smashing the receiver of a radio brings to an end all the
evidences the instrument had until then been giving that a program was on the
air, but that this does not in the least warrant concluding that the program was
a product of the radio and therefore had automatically lapsed when the latter
was smashed.
The hidden premise of the contention that the cessation at death of all
evidences of consciousness entails that consciousness itself then necessarily
ceases is, evidently, that the relation of brain activity to consciousness is
always that of cause to effect, never that of effect to cause. But this hidden
premise is not known to be true, and is not the only imaginable one consistent
with the empirical facts listed in Chapt. III. Quite as consistent with them is
the supposition, which was brought forth by William James, that the brain's
function is that of intermediary between psychological states or activities, and
the body's sense organs. muscles, and glands. That is, that the brain's function
is that of receiver-transmitter - sometimes from body to mind and sometimes from
mind to body.
These remarks are not intended to answer or to hint at a particular answer to
the question of the nature of the relation between brain or body and mind; but
only to make evident that the validity or invalidity of the conclusion, from the
various empirical facts cited in Chapt. III, that man's consciousness cannot
survive the death of his body, is wholly dependent on what really is the
relation between body and mind.
Our task in the remaining chapters of Part III must therefore be to consider the
various hypotheses which, in the history of thought, have been offered
concerning the nature of that relation, and to decide which one among them best
seems to accord with all the definitely known facts.
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